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This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the 
auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we 
apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects 
do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need 
European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in 
future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-
benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority 
projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important 
spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to discuss the selection of potential large-scale transport investments based on 
several modelling approaches. We focus on the trans-European transport networks (TEN-T) that encompass 
the major planned transport infrastructure in Europe, as depicted in Figure 1. The concept of a trans-
European transport network was formally recognized in the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the current 
priority list consists of 30 “priority” projects to be launched before 2010
2. Investment in transport 
infrastructure does not, however, end with the TEN-T, as the Commission has already proposed the 
adoption of five trans-national axes
3, with the purpose of extending the major TEN-T infrastructure to 
neighbouring countries. European Union interest in the TEN-T has been mainly concerned with the 
removal of bottlenecks and the completion of missing links to strengthen the internal market
4. The Van 
Miert Group
5, which reported to the Commission on the trans-European network in 2003, defined 
“European added value” based on a number of selection criteria, including potential socio-economic value. 
The current priority list consists of projects designated to be of common interest and additionally judged to 
have overall, net socio-economic benefits.
6 At present 5 of the 30 priority projects have been completed or 
are about to be (EC, 2009). Legislative instruments are also in place for the European Commission to 
subsidize priority projects and provide financial and political support to the member countries to encourage 
the development of the projects.
7  
 
In this paper we test this claim, from a purely economic perspective, by performing cost-benefit analyses 
(CBA) for the priority projects using several transport modelling approaches ranging from a macro to micro 
scale. In general, a project is worthwhile (or efficient), if it passes a cost-benefit threshold, which is the first 
step in our analysis. It should be noted that a project may be worthwhile at the European level but not for a 
specific member country through which the infrastructure crosses. In that case, a European subsidy may be 
necessary to encourage the member country to invest, leading to an additional step in which the expected 
welfare benefits of the selected projects on a European scale are evaluated (“European value added”). 
These judgements may also consider the issues from an equity standpoint, namely whether richer or poorer 
regions will benefit from a given investment. Since CBA can be performed with different levels of 
sophistication, we use three complementary models to assess the projects as comprehensively as possible 
using the data available. 
 
                                                 
2 Decision 884/2004/EC 
3 Communication of the European Commission COM (2007) 32: Extension of the major trans-European transport axes to the 
neighbouring countries and regions 
4 See for example Regulation (EC) No 680/2007,  
5 Report of the Van Miert High Level Group on the trans-European network, June 2003. 
6 Decision 884/2004/EC 
7 Regulation (EC) No 680/2007, Decision 2007/60/EC, Decision 884/2004/EC   3
Based on a reasonable CBA threshold, it appears that the selection of TEN-T priority projects was not 
efficient. Of the 22 projects assessed in a consistent manner, only 13 pass an elementary efficiency test and 
only a minority of these have any real “European value added” that may be considered a reasonable 
justification for E.U. financial aid.  One explanation for the apparent poor choice of priority projects is 
frequently defined as “pork-barrel” politics, which is likely to occur when transportation investments 
favour a particular constituency, leading to the risk of oversupply when paid for at the federal level . This is 
consistent with evidence on the allocation of the federal Highway Trust Fund in the US (Knight (2004)). 
Potential remedies include standardising the CBA procedure under specific, pre-defined rules and limiting 
European level subsidies only to projects that generate significant benefits (time savings, freight cost 
savings) accruing to users outside the investing countries. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we discuss the methodologies applied to undertake a cost-
benefit analysis of the 30 E.U. TEN-T priority projects. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we use three different models 
to implement the cost-benefit tests from an E.U. wide perspective to a network based approach down to a 
specific project study. In section 6 we take stock of the results and draw policy conclusions.  
 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Cost-benefit analysis as main assessment principle 
Transport investment was one of the first fields in which the methodology of CBA was applied for decision 
making. Famous examples in the U.K. are the M1 motorway, the Victoria line on the London underground 
and the third London airport. In France there is a long tradition of “le calcul economique” (Lesourne,1964). 
According to Bristow and Nellthorp (2000), the methodology of CBA and its application to transport 
investments has become more or less standard practice in many European countries including the U.K., 
France, the Netherlands and Germany. These countries have developed manuals (DETR, 2000; OEEI, 
1999; BMV, 1993) that are regularly updated. In other countries there is no standard CBA practice and the 
technique is used for some projects but not for others. At the level of the European Commission there exist 
manuals defining appropriate rules for CBA. Tsamboulas (2007) argues that a multi-criteria analysis is 
more appropriate than a CBA for the assessment of multinational transport projects if there is insufficient 
information, projects interact and values differ across countries. To the contrary, in this paper we argue that 
the CBA methodology can be applied using a minimum of data per project, given project interaction 
despite countries demonstrating diverging interests in a project.  
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Figure 1: The priority list of TEN-T projects (source: CEC) 
 
 
A CBA can be defined as a simplified welfare economic assessment based on a (partial) model of the 
economy. The choice of the economic model and the welfare function will determine the level of 
sophistication of the CBA. Beyond the traditional measurement of time and other benefits to users and the 
fixed project costs, there are three additional levels of sophistication that are sometimes introduced. The 
first accounts for the side-effects of transport investments that may be considered with regard to alternative 
transport modes, the environment and the rest of the economy for a given location. This is relevant if there 
are important market distortions including monopoly margins, taxes and externalities in these markets. For 
example, a high speed rail investment may divert demand from the aviation sector. If air travellers paid a   5
price in excess of the marginal cost, the subsequent decline in air travellers implies a loss of profits for the 
airline industry. This is a loss that ought to be accounted for in the CBA, as the transfer from air to rail 
saves fewer real resources than appears in the consumer surplus gain within the rail market (see Kidokoro 
2004 for a demonstration of the effects on transport networks). Similarly, if air transport was taxed heavily, 
the loss of tax revenues from the air transport market is a net welfare loss to be taken into account because 
the real resource saving of a decease in air transport volume is understated. Consider next the 
environmental damage associated with air transport. If user prices for air travel equal the social marginal 
cost and rail is environmentally harmless, any reduction in air transport saves environmental damages and 
this represents an extra benefit to be accounted for in the social welfare computations. One of the largest 
market distortions in an economy are labour taxes. If any gap or surplus in the government budget 
generated by the project is paid for through supplementary labour taxes, this may justify a “marginal cost of 
funds” premium for projects that generate additional public revenue. The effects on public revenues appear 
via changes in subsidised transport markets but can also be drawn from higher labour participation when 
commuting times decrease.  
 
The second addition to a CBA considers the income distribution effects of the investment project. Income 
distribution across income groups or among regions is often used as a political argument to favour specific 
projects, therefore it may be useful to define them explicitly within the project assessment. For example, 
specific equity thresholds could be defined within the CBA guidelines. The third dimension considers the 
effect of the proposed infrastructure on regional growth, including new economic activities attracted to a 
region as a direct result of the project. This is obviously important with respect to regional distribution. For 
the first and second levels of sophistication, the techniques are known and not disputed (Calthrop et al., 
2010, and Mayeres and Proost, 2001). With regard to the endogenous location of economic activities, the 
methodology is more difficult to implement, certainly for a specific project (Fujita and Thisse, 2008).  
2.2 Modelling tools  
The most direct approach for assessing the selection of projects would be to analyze the existing cost-
benefit studies and verify their quality. There have been several transport modelling studies of the TEN-T 
projects, not all of them focusing on the cost benefit assessment.  De Jong et al. (2004) survey some of the 
international models, such as STEMM and SCENES, used to assess these projects.  Despite the presence of 
several modeling frameworks for European transport projects, no CBA was available for the vast majority 
of European TEN-T projects, despite repeated and direct requests to the E.U. Commission. This led us to 
generate alternative approaches based on the data available. Since no individual model could answer all 
relevant questions, we developed three different models in an attempt to produce CBA’s based on available 
data. The three types of models used are presented in Table 1 and greater detail is provided in the 
subsequent sections.  
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Table 1: Role of model approaches to assess TEN-T priority projects  
  Continent-wide model  Network-based model  Project-based model 
Characteristics  Model of interregional 
trade and regional 
activity in Europe 
Model for E.U. long- 
distance passenger 
transport market 
Model for any case study 
that can be represented as a 
small network 








High level of 
sophistication, not 
portable 
High level of 
sophistication, 
reasonably portable 
Medium, in principle 
portable 
Transport effects  Aggregate level 
Focus on freight 
Detailed for network 
considered 
Focus on passengers 
Limited to case study  
Focus on freight and 
passengers 
Pricing variants  Endogenous pricing of 
traded commodities, 
transport pricing is 
exogenous 
Endogenous Nash 




Endogenous Nash pricing as 
well as exogenous pricing 
principles (marginal social 
cost pricing, average cost 




Aggregate with focus 
on freight transport 




No  No – possible ex-post  Yes 
Results  Checking regional 
implications of a large 
investment project 




Assessing pricing and 
investment of one specific 
project 
 
The three selected models each operate at a different scale. The first, continent-wide model (CGEurope, 
Bröcker et al. (2010)) draws on the field of new economic geography in order to assess E.U. wide effects of 
investment and pricing strategies of the TEN-Ts. CGEurope has no detailed transport network 
representation rather considers the potential relocation effects of production. The model analyzes 260 
regions that each produce a variety of differentiated goods. The regions are linked via endogenous trade 
and the effect of transport investments is to decrease the transport costs between specific regions. This 
model permits endogenous relocation of production activity and trade, tracks regional distribution effects 
but is too aggregated to look into market distortions in the transport or labour market. The second, network-
based model studies the European long distance passenger transport market where the competition between 
air and rail promises to be intense (Adler et al. (2010)). This model analyzes the interactions between 
different transport markets but is a partial equilibrium approach that does not describe income 
redistribution. The third, project-based model (MOLINO – II, de Palma et al (2010)) is a generic model that 
can be applied to any project for which some project data are available. The model addresses different 
types of market distortions and integrates income distribution dimensions.  
 
In summation, the first, generalized model provides a comparable, aggregated assessment of almost all 
priority projects. The second, network style model tests all the High Speed Rail (HSR) investments on the 
priority list in greater detail. The third approach represents a more detailed assessment of a particular   7
project that allows the importance of pricing and financing variants to be tested. It could only be applied to 
a few projects, for which more detailed studies were available. In sections 3, 4 and 5 we detail the results of 
each modelling approach and in section 6, draw on the results of this top down approach, in an attempt to 
delineate clear public policy guidelines with regard to the funding of infrastructure at a federal level. 
 
3. Testing European-wide spatial equity and efficiency impacts of the 
priority TEN-Ts    
 
In order to analyse the spatial impacts of the priority projects for the regions of the European Union with 
the CGEurope model, each priority project of the trans-European transport projects (TEN-T) is considered 
individually. The main output of CGEurope is, for each transport investment, the real income effect by 
region and scenario year. This can then be used to generate a number of measures for testing the efficiency 
and equity impacts of each project. 
 
The CGEurope model has a household sector and a production sector with two industries, one producing 
local goods, the other producing tradables under conditions of monopolistic competition. Every region is 
interested in offering a large variety of goods, including those produced by other regions but this requires 
freight transport infrastructure. Consequently each region faces a trade-off between diversity and costs. 
Regions interact through costly trade with trade costs depending, among other things, on the state of the 
infrastructure. New or upgraded links reduce trade costs, which changes trade flows, production, goods 
prices and factor prices and thus eventually the welfare of households in different regions. As the model is 
only able to quantify effects related to trade in goods, a simplified approach is used to add effects stemming 
from passenger transport. The model is sufficiently simple to allow for a calibration with rather limited 
information for a large number of regions. It incorporates ideas from New Economic Geography (NEG) 
(see Fujita et al. 2000) in that it models trade by the popular Dixit-Stiglitz (Dixit and Stiglitz 1977) 
approach. Another ingredient of NEG models, the endogenous emergence of agglomerations, is however 
missing in the model due to the assumption of factor immobility.  
 
We report the results of the continent-wide modelling approach in Table 2. Suitable data were available for 
22 of the 30 priority projects
8. Each project is identified by a number and a short description of the route 
and mode. The third column presents the computed internal rate of return of the project, counting all costs 
and benefits for the E.U. as a whole. The internal rate of return is the real rate of interest that makes the 
discounted sum of benefits equal to the investment cost, C, of the project. The benefit of the project 
consists of the real income increase generated by the decrease in production costs and the gain in variety 
associated with the decrease in freight costs. It is assumed that the user prices cover the operation costs. 
                                                 
8 Projects that had already been completed were not modeled. Further, Galileo, Motorways of the Sea and all Inland Waterway 
projects were excluded since they were beyond the scope of CGEurope.    8
The benefit, B, is computed for a representative year (2020) and the project’s lifetime is assumed to be 
infinite
9. The internal rate of return is then the rate r that sets the discounted benefit B/r = C. The internal 
rate of return r is subsequently compared to a benchmark discount rate, d, and the former needs to be higher 
in order for the project benefits to be larger than the opportunity cost of the investment. The third column 
thus measures the pure efficiency effect of the transport project: total benefits in the E.U. minus total 
investment costs. The fourth column measures the share of the total E.U. welfare effects that is realized in 
the countries beyond the country where the investment takes place. When this share is zero, there is no 
“European value added”, as all welfare benefits are localized in the country that makes the investment 
whereas if it is less than zero, it means that a particular project has negative spillover effects. In the latter 
case the project decreases welfare in other countries which could arise through the adjustment of the trade 
and traffic flows. This indicator may be more difficult to compute for projects that are located in and 
financed by many member states, as the scope for spatial spillovers may then be more limited. In the fifth 
column we measure the equity effect of the project. In order to compute the equity indicator we need two 
elements: the distribution of the benefits and the distribution of the costs. The benefits (decreased freight 
costs that lead to greater variety in consumption) are available per region. For the allocation of the 
investment costs we need a few rules of thumb. We assume that the project is financed by the investing 
country and by the other countries in proportion to their share in the benefits. For the non investing 
countries it is assumed that their share in the investment cost is financed by the E.U. via a proportional 
E.U.-wide levy tax on GDP. This assumption is a good approximation for levies that take the form of 
gasoline taxes or of a larger share in V.A.T. receipts. We subsequently evaluate the equity effect of the 
project by calculating the correlation coefficient between the regional real income gains (in monetary 
terms) due to project implementation less the corresponding contribution to investment costs, and the 
relative GDP per capita of the relevant country. A positive correlation coefficient means that richer regions 
benefit more from the project implementation and the form of finance, while a negative value would mean 
that poorer regions benefit. Since most TEN-T projects affect many different regions and countries, we 
would not expect the correlation coefficients to be large in absolute terms. 
Technically, the rate of return is high or low if the absolute cost saving is high or low correspondingly. 
There are two reasons for the estimated cost savings (one of the benefits) from the project to be low: 1) low 
relative cost change (for example, if there are alternative routes that can be used in a given direction, and 
capacity constraints are not binding), and 2) low absolute levels of traffic in the benchmark (including 
transit traffic). For project 5, the Betuwe freight rail line, which shows low levels of efficiency, the first 
case is relevant, whereas project 29, the intermodal corridor Ioannian Sea/Adria, which also proved 
problematic, both cases are accurate. For projects 8, 17, 20, 23 and 25, in which the cost-benefit threshold 
proved reasonable, both the cost changes and the traffic levels are high.   
                                                 
9 In the network-based model, discussed in section 4, the project lifetime was assumed to be 40 years as this was considered more 
suitable for rail equipment. Compared to an infinite lifetime, a 40 year basis is equal to increasing the annual cost of the investment by 
15%.   9
Drawing on the results presented in Table 2 leads us to three general conclusions. Firstly, based on a 
benchmark real discount rate of 5%, only 12 of the 22 projects pass the pure CBA or efficiency test and are 
deemed worthy of financing. We also tested whether project inter-dependency benefits are of importance 
because this could help to justify undertaking groups of projects that have, in isolation, a low internal rate 
of return. However, the continent-wide model found few significant interactions. In general, the newer 
projects that have been added in the most recent revision of the TEN-T projects, have a higher internal rate 
of return than the projects on the older list of 20 projects. A few caveats should be noted, as the analysis 
does not consist of a full CBA for each project. It does not include the variations in external effects such as 
noise, accidents, pollution, external congestion or any gains for local transport. In addition, the benefits 
accruing from passenger transport are evaluated in a simplified manner, since these trips are not present in 
the general equilibrium system (Bröcker et al., 2009). This is especially relevant for the assessment of the 
high-speed rail projects which mainly impact passenger transport. When we focus on the passenger benefits 
with the network model in section 4, we find higher net benefits for the HSR projects 1, 3, 6 and 17. 
 
Secondly, we see that in many cases the share of the investing countries in the benefits of the project 
(column 4 in Table 2) is rather high and the benefits to other countries rather low, which is surprising given 
the fact that the TEN-T projects were selected under the criterion that they are cross-border and would 
therefore benefit multiple countries in the E.U. Consequently, the “European value added” of half of the 
projects is below 10% and two projects even have a significant negative impact on other countries, namely 
projects 13 and 26. Only five projects have an internal rate of return over 5% and offer a reasonable share 
of benefits to other countries (spillovers), namely projects 8, 17, 20, 23, and 25 could justifiably argue that 
financial aid from the federal level would make economic sense. Our results confirm sceptical views that 
have been expressed in the literature (Sichelschmidt, 1999).  
 
Lastly, with respect to the issue of equity, some of the 22 projects mostly benefit the richer countries, while 
other projects mostly benefit the poorer countries. Hence, neither do we observe a systematic tendency of 
the selected TEN-T projects to favour lagging regions, nor is the opposite true. Of the four projects 
identified as being both efficient and providing European value added, three have significantly negative 
equity coefficients, providing further evidence that federal financing could provide positive results.   10
 
Table 2: Assessment of 22 priority projects using the CGEurope model 
Projec
t # 
Name of the project  EFFICIENCY: 
EU-wide yearly 














GDP per capita, 
(1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
1  HSR combined transport North-South   1.56  3  5.13 
2 HSR  Paris-Cologne-Amsterdam-London  2.07  47  17.98 
3  HSR south: Madrid-Barcelon-
Montpellier/Madrid-Dax 
4.48 7  6.24 
4  High speed rail Paris-Karlsruhe / Luxembourg 
/ Saarbruecken 
5.18  4 14.69 
5  Betuwe line Rotterdam-Rhein/Ruhr  0.01  55  -0.12 
6 HSR  Lyon-Venice-Trieste/Koper-Ljubljana-
Budapest 
1.38 8  4.79 
7  Greek motorways (Via Egnatia, Pathe), 
motorways in Bulgaria and Romania 
4.89 19  -15.77 
8  Multimodal link Portugal-Spain-Central 
Europe 
6.83  23 -10.71 
12 Nordic  triangle  2.04  8  20.81 
13  Ireland / UK / Benelux road link  5.95  -6 21.96 
14  West coast main line  1.20  7  23.14 
16  HSR across the Pyrenees, freight line Sines-
Badajoz 
8.18  -1 -1.72 
17  HSR combined transport East-West  5.16  50 12.00 
20  Fixed link Fehmarn Belt  9.85  32 10.03 
22 Rail  Athina-Kulata-Sofia-Budapest-Vienna-
Praha-Nuernberg 
9.98  12 -32.12 
23 Rail  Gdansk-Warsaw-Katowice-Brno/Zilinia  9.47  25 -29.09 
24 Rail  Lyon/Geneva-Basel-Duisburg-Rotterdam-
Antwerp 
2.87 3  17.26 
25 Motorway  Gdansk-Katowice-Brno-Vienna  14.82  30 -14.32 
26 Multi-modal  link  Ireland/UK/continental 
Europe 
18.47  -5 16.36 
27 Rail  Baltica  16.07  5 -15.87 
28 Eurocaprail  Brussels-Luxembourg-Strasbourg  9.10  14 14.58 
29  Intermodal corridor Ioannian Sea/Adria  0.05  3  -8.66 
 
4. Do the High Speed Rail extension projects make sense?  
 
The second, network-based model evaluates the likely equilibrium outcomes on the European long distance 
passenger network for rail and air travel that results from the competition between one European rail 
operator and five airlines. A distinction is made between three hub-spoke legacy carriers roughly 
representing the three global alliances and two low cost, regional airlines. Only one European rail operator 
is distinguished for three reasons: this maximizes the profitability of the rail project (avoiding the issue of   11
double marginalization (Tirole (1988), De Borger, Dunkerley, Proost, 2007); there is de facto 
institutionalized cooperation across countries (Eurostar, Thalys); and, finally, the objectives of the existing 
rail operators are unclear as are the legal entities likely to exist by the year 2020. The network analyzed 
included 71 zones, three of which represented traffic flow to America, Africa and the Far East. All 27 E.U. 
countries are represented, some more disaggregated than others in order to cover the train network in 
greater detail, as shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
















Figure 2: High speed rail TEN-T projects (source CEC) 
 
Using a game theoretic setting, the network-based model computes equilibria with and without the high-
speed rail investments, permitting analyses of the level of rail infrastructure charges on the transport 
operators’ behavior. This is an important issue, since it has been argued that rail infrastructure charges play 
a major role in determining the competitive position of high speed rail (UIC, 2008) and the ability to utilize 
the infrastructure efficiently. A social welfare function enables an objective analysis of the potential effects 
of such changes on producers (privatized companies providing transportation services), consumers (the 
traveling public, split into business and leisure categories), government authorities (local and federal) and 
the infrastructure manager, accounting for the effects of infrastructure modifications on taxes and subsidies 
as well as the environment. The passengers’ choice among alternatives is based on the discrete choice 
theory of product differentiation (Anderson et al., 1996). A representative consumer is assumed for each 
traveler class (business, leisure) to choose the travel alternative (mode and route) which yields the highest   12
utility. The utility depends on the various characteristics of the alternative, including fare, travel time, 
distance, routing etc. The no-travel / road option is also included such that demand for air and rail can 
increase or decrease following a change in one of the variables explaining the utility of a passenger. 
Without this option, such a change would only lead to a redistribution of demand over the various air and 
rail alternatives. 
 
In equilibrium, the rail and air transport operators maximize profits and compete in prices and frequency of 
service. The model was solved for different scenarios of the European HSR infrastructure; here the TEN-T 
investments are the joint implementation of four TEN-T projects (1, 3, 6 and 17)
10 . Table 3 summarizes the 
results as changes compared to two reference scenarios. Both reference scenarios exclude TEN-T HSR 
investments and the links are assumed to exist but support only conventional rail that runs at a speed of 130 
km/h. In the first reference scenario it is assumed that the HSR operator will be charged an access charge 
set exogenously at €2/km, which roughly corresponds to marginal cost pricing of the use of the 
infrastructure. In the second reference scenario it is assumed that the access charges will be based on 
average cost, set at €10/km (the values were drawn from GRACE (2005), an E.U. funded project), hence 
recovering the full infrastructure cost. In computing the cost of the infrastructure, we have assumed a 40-
year economic life for each of the projects and a 5% discount rate. The marginal cost of public funds 
utilized in the social welfare computation was set at 1.2 (Calthrop et al., 2009). In the social welfare 
computation, the externalities caused by the generation of transport have been monetized according to the 
mode of transport and include marginal environmental, accident and noise charges (INFRAS/IWW, 2004). 
The environmental charges have been simplified to a single fixed charge per flight or train trip. The values 
presented in Table 3 set environmental charges at €100 per flight and €50 per train service. 
 
                                                 
10 Note that in contrast to the previous section, the impact of these projects on business and leisure passenger travel only is analysed in 
this model and not freight.    13
Table 3: Welfare assessment of 4 high-speed rail TEN-T projects with the 
passenger network-based model (€/day): changes compared to reference 
scenario without TEN’s  
Infrastructure Charging Case   (1)  (2) 
Rail Access Charge (€/km)  2  10 
Consumer Surplus    29,597,167   12,663,677 
Producer Surplus    14,504,893   ‐ 2,155,691 
Environmental Charge  1,270,123     435,565  
Air Taxes  ‐180,560     ‐ 1,109,331  
Rail Taxes  7,640,220     0  
Government Surplus    10,475,737   ‐ 808,519 
Externalities: Europe   ‐ 273,788   ‐ 164,718 
Externalities: International    39,118   ‐ 16,015 







Infrastructure Manager Surplus     ‐13,423,589     ‐ 13,424,487 
Social Welfare     40,919,538     ‐ 3,905,753 
 
   
cost recovery constraint. If the rail infrastructure provider is constrained to break even, he has to charge 10€ 
per train kilometre which forces the train operator to charge prices beyond the marginal social cost. The 
result is a large loss in consumer and producer surplus and the investment no longer generates a net benefit. 
If the railway infrastructure provider is not permitted to adopt a two-part tariff pricing scheme that 
generates revenue while keeping marginal user prices for the train operator close to the marginal cost, the 
infrastructure will not be utilized efficiently and the government will need to cover the full investment cost. 
This leads to the risk of attracting oversized investments and overstated project benefits. Of course, if the 
real infrastructure costs were underestimated, as has proven true in the past (Flyvbjerg et al., 2004), the 
outcomes may be considerably less favourable. When the high-speed rail operator is charged more than the 
marginal social costs, we need to consider case (2) and then efficiency (social welfare) decreases. This also 
implies that the scope for funding the investment via higher markups on the users is limited and that large 
subsidies are needed to realize the efficiency gains associated with these TEN projects.  
 
HSR projects are often defended on environmental grounds. In our assessment, environmental externalities 
play only a minor role in the comparison of the alternative scenarios (rows 7 and 8 of table 3), since the 
higher levels of externalities caused by greater use of air transport are of a magnitude smaller than a quarter 
of a million € per day. In conclusion, using the more detailed network-based competitive model, which is 
better suited to take into account the network effects of HSR and the effects on the competing mode 
(mainly air), we generate both similar and contrasting results to those of the CGEurope model reported in 
Table 2. The rough way in which the effects on passenger transport are taken into account in the CGEurope 
calculations can be expected to substantially downsize the consumer surplus and overall social welfare   14
computations demonstrated in Table 3. Consequently, whilst the four HSR projects are unlikely to recover 
majority of the fixed costs of the infrastructure, they do improve both consumer and producer surpluses, 
dependent on the infrastructure charging policy. 
 
5. Analysing four TEN-T projects under the project-based model   
 
The most detailed level of analysis, at a project level (MOLINO-II), is designed to perform CBA and to test 
the impact of different pricing and investment rules on any transport infrastructure project. In principle, 
every project may be studied and for the E.U. or an investor in general, it may be easier and more 
consistent to use the same simple model to assess very different projects. Compared to the network-based 
model used for the HSR extensions, MOLINO-II has a simpler network, analysing only one project at a 
time, but allows for a wider range of pricing policies and a financial analysis. Compared to the continent-
wide model, MOLINO-II does not consider endogenous relocation of production activity levels but takes 
on board, in a detailed way, all externalities as well as local transport. We will discuss four of the TEN-T 
projects including the Betuwe line (project 5), the Gdansk–Vienna/Bratislava corridor (projects 23 and 25), 
the Brenner Tunnel (project 1) and the Seine-Scheldt (project 30) in order to draw additional information 
that can only be captured in a detailed study. 
The core of the model is a representation of the transport market with several alternatives. These 
alternatives can be different modes or parallel routes for the same mode in a given network context. Each 
alternative can be used for freight and passenger transport. The demand module for passenger transport 
features an aggregate nested CES utility function with three levels: choice between transport and 
consumption of a composite commodity, choice between peak and off-peak periods, and choice between 
the two transport alternatives. Elasticities of substitution at each level are parametrically given. Passengers 
can be segmented into classes that differ with respect to their travel preferences, incomes and costs of travel 
time. The demand module for freight transport is based on an aggregate CES cost function (production 
levels are given) and also features three levels. The first level encompasses choice between transport and 
other production inputs (more capital and labour under the form of more warehousing etc), and the second 
and third levels are the same as for passenger transport. Freight transport can be segmented into different 
classes (e.g. local and transit traffic). Transport users pay a generalised cost that contains several 
components: a resource cost (e.g. fuel for a car), taxes levied by central and local governments (e.g. fuel 
taxes and car taxes), a user fee (toll or rail fare) and a time cost. For a given infrastructure, travel time 
depends on the ratio of volume to capacity. The core of MOLINO-II is completed with a financial fund 
module that includes welfare computations composed of external costs and public finance variables. 
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Figure 3: The Gdansk-Vienna corridor in MOLINO format 
 
 
The  Gdansk–Vienna/Bratislava corridor (see FIGURE 3) is a roughly 900  km long North-South 
corridor, linking the Baltic Sea port of Gdansk to the Central European capital cities Vienna and Bratislava. 
Within the TEN-T priority projects, a road project (project 25) and a rail project (project 23) are planned 
along this corridor. The analysis presented here is limited to the Polish part of the corridor. The overall 
investment along the entire corridor is estimated at around €7.8 billion for road development and €5.5 
billion for the rail corridor. Both rail and road projects, as well as their combination, generate welfare gains 
and this holds true for three pricing regimes: current (lower than marginal cost) pricing, marginal social 
cost pricing (including road pricing) and average cost pricing for rail. Social marginal cost pricing will   16
provide the highest levels of social welfare and would also generate much larger revenues for the rail and 
road operators compared to other pricing regimes. In terms of economic efficiency, the likely performance 
of this project appears to be reasonable.  Consequently, this infrastructure project appears to be reasonable 
and can claim national aid but should not require E.U. financial aid. 
 
The Betuwe line is a railway project connecting the port of Rotterdam with the Rhein/Ruhr area. The 
Dutch part of the rail track was opened for transport in 2007 and cost €4.7 billion. For the analysis of the 
Betuwe line, MOLINO was used to assess the effects of different pricing scenarios on the economic and 
financial viability of this project. One scenario involved full marginal social cost pricing for all transport 
modes, which performed better than the current pricing approach whereby road use is underpriced. 
However, the Betuwe line gains only a small market share of the total traffic between the Hamburg-Le 
Havre range of ports and the German Ruhr area. The net discounted benefits are negative and close to the 
investment cost. Thus, the project is not justifiable economically and can only survive financially with a 
subsidy that covers close to 100% of the initial investment. The project-based model corroborates fully the 
analysis of the CGEurope model, where this project was deemed inefficient. Unfortunately, the rail line has 
already been built.  
 
 
The Brenner tunnel which is an important part of the TEN-T project 1 covering a rail corridor from Berlin 
to Palermo was also analysed with the project-based model. The tunnel will be dedicated purely to rail 
transport and is expected to cost at least €4.5 billion (Proost et al, 2008). Comparing the computed net 
benefits after nine years of operation with the investment cost of €4.5 billion, even under the optimal 
pricing scenario of marginal social cost pricing, will generate net benefits of less than 5% of the total 
investment. In economic terms, this is a very weak project and confirms the results for project 1 found in 
the continent-wide model results presented in Table 2. The major problem is that there is enough rail 
capacity on the North-South link when all routes in neighbouring Switserland (Gothard, Lötschberg) are 
taken into account.. 
 
The aim of the Seine-Scheldt
11 project is to connect Belgium and the Netherlands, in particular the ports of 
Rotterdam and Antwerp to northern France and Paris via inland waterways. The main bottleneck for inland 
waterway transport in this region is the Canal du Nord between Compiègne and Cambrai. Navigability on 
this section is at the lower end of international standards, with access restricted to vessels of about 300 tons 
on some stretches. This canal will be replaced by a new large-gauge canal, which allows barges with a 
loading capacity up to 4,400 tonnes to pass. Belgium also plans to improve navigability on the axis north of 
this bottleneck. We concentrate our analysis on the newly constructed canal between Compiegne and 
Cambrai, as it is the most important investment project planned for this axis. The canal will cost at least 
                                                 
11 Note that this Inland waterways project is priority axis 30 and was not included in the continent-wide analysis.    17
€2.3 billion and is planned to be in use in 2012. Again we find low economic efficiency benefits based on 
the first nine years of operation as the net benefits are of the order of 5 to 10% of the total investment. 
There are several reasons for this: the overall freight demand in this corridor is low and there are parallel 
rail and road options that are not yet saturated. Usually, it is argued that freight traffic on canals should 
cover only a fraction of the investment costs, since a canal creates additional benefits, including water 
management, flood protection, accessibility for recreational vessels and recreational facilities on 
embankments in addition to electric power generation. Traditionally, this lowers the required threshold of 
net benefits to 50 - 70% of the investment, yet this too appears unlikely to be achieved. 
  
6. Infrastructure policy recommendations 
Our analysis of the selection of projects for the very ambitious TEN-T plan leads to the following four 
conclusions. Firstly, for most projects that have been selected for E.U. funding, no CBA was made publicly 
available. Secondly, our analysis of a selection of 22 of the 30 projects, within a consistent top-down CBA 
framework, shows that only 12 out of 22 projects pass the elementary efficiency test at a discount rate of 
5%. Thirdly, only a minority of the selected projects has any real European value added which should be 
the basis for applying for E.U. financial aid. Lastly, the TEN-T projects are not situated systematically in 
the poorer regions so it is difficult to defend the selection on pure equity grounds. Further assessment with 
more detailed models mainly confirms these results but indicate that the TEN-T HSR projects may generate 
social benefits at the European level. The main source of benefits is not the environmental advantage to air 
transport but the cost savings and the consumer surplus. This clearly depends on marginal cost pricing for 
the use of the infrastructure, and this requires high (country and E.U.) subsidies for the construction.  
6.1 Possible explanations 
 
The selection of transport projects under the TEN-T process appears to fail a basic cost-benefit style 
analysis. How could this happen? According to political economy theory, the traditional static common-
agency lobbying model (Dixit et al (1997)) suggests that a policy maker is influenced by the voting and 
lobbying processes. The voting process, defined as a black box, results in policies that maximise a weighted 
sum of individual utility functions. Lobby groups propose to the government a menu of (truthful) lobbying 
contributions. The lobbying contributions proposed to the policy maker are a function of the policies under 
discussion and the closer the proposed policy matches the preferences of the lobby group, the higher the 
lobbying contributions are likely to be. In addition, different groups compete to influence the policy maker.  
Utilizing this framework, let us consider the decision to build a specific road or public transport investment 
in a remote location that cannot be tolled, which is defined as a specific public good (a particular bridge, 
tunnel etc.). As Persson (1998) and others pointed out, the supply of specific public goods financed by a   18
general tax is a very common way to favour a specific lobby group (known as “pork barrel politics”). The 
problem is that the benefits derived from such an investment are enjoyed by a small group, while the costs 
are spread over a large group of taxpayers. This provides the local lobby group with a relatively high pay-
off which will be higher when the users pay only a small fraction of the average cost.  
Knight (2004) used the representative democracy model of Baron and Ferejohn (1987) to analyze the 
decision making process applied to the Interstate Highway Fund in the U.S.A. in the nineties. In this model,  
the elected representatives will try to favour their own constituency. When a representative becomes the 
agenda setter, he will form a winning majority of states by selecting those states that are not costly to please 
in terms of public works and will use the opportunity to favour his district by selecting an oversupply of 
federally paid public works in his state. Knight shows that for every dollar that is invested, an additional 
dollar was wasted leading to the funding of a substantial number of inefficient projects. 
The E.U. decision process is rather different from the process in most federal countries. In the E.U., it is the 
council of all European Ministers of Transport that is pivotal in the selection of transport infrastructure 
projects. It acts upon a proposal of the administration (European Commission) but has enough power to set 
the agenda and steer the proposals to some extent. The decision of the Ministers is then approved by the 
European Parliament, known as a co-decision process. As the decision process changes regularly and 
involves many stages, it is difficult to advance one simple explanation with respect to the selection of 
projects. Instead, we give two hypotheses that may advance our understanding of the final project selection. 
The first is that investment money needs to be spread out over an adequate number of countries and regions 
to obtain a sufficient majority in the European Parliament. Let us assume that a project, concentrated in one 
or two countries involving spillovers to the entire European region, existed. This would be unlikely to be 
politically acceptable at a European level as the system is built such that opportunities to spend federal 
money needs to be spread across many countries in order to garner sufficient support in the parliament. 
Consequently, only a portfolio of projects would pass the majority threshold, irrespective of the individual 
economic efficiency of each project. In this context, it would appear to be reasonable to assume that 
European ministers of transport systematically chose projects that favour their home constituencies.  
The second hypothesis is that many large transport investments have been accepted on the basis of the 
general transport policy that advocated a strong expansion of rail passenger and rail freight to address road 
congestion and environmental objectives including GHG emissions. In the CEC (2001) paper, the objective 
of E.U. transport policy was defined as the need to approximately double the market share of both 
passenger and freight rail traffic, which had fallen in 1998 to 6% (passenger) and 8% (freight) respectively. 
The majority of the proposed TEN projects are indeed rail projects while their share in overall transport 
volume is clearly low. When there are absolute modal shift objectives, there is a clear motivation to accept 
rail projects with a low economic rate of return even if the CBA includes a correct valuation of savings in 
environmental costs.    19
 
In conclusion, when transportation investments are of use mostly to a small group, be it in a particular 
region and/or a specific mode, the risk of oversupply exists when it is financed at  federal level. The 
analysis of the decision making process at the E.U. level is difficult. However, there remains one major 
difference between the U.S. and E.U. funds, since the latter requires a greater level of matching from the 
countries involved which may explain why many of these projects, defined in 1995 as priorities, still exist 
only on paper. 
6.2 Potential institutional remedies  
 
The discussion so far leads us to the inevitable question as to what instruments can prevent this 
misallocation of resources? Two powerful ingredients in the mechanism design required to ensure optimal 
infrastructure planning include the CBA procedure itself and the share of the projects that may be legally 
funded by federal public money.  
 
Bristow and Nellthorp (2000) find that there is a wide variation of CBA procedures amongst the E.U. 
members. Ideally, we should test the quality of decision making in the different countries and relate this to 
the procedures used. We limit ourselves to one country that has built a tradition of CBA and has 
documented the outcomes, namely the Netherlands. In 2000, the Netherlands introduced a requirement that 
all CBA for major infrastructure projects be carried out using published guidelines. The results are in 
principle available to Parliament and therefore to the general public. In addition, the Netherlands 
determines that a CBA is only credible if it is reviewed by peers, in other words, they instituted the practice 
of a “second opinion”. Annema et al (2007) discussed the effects of this requirement on decision making in 
practice. They find that of the 13 projects reviewed, decisions on 6 projects are still pending, 3 projects 
exhibited negative CBAs and two of these three were accepted by the government, although one project 
was subsequently postponed for budgetary reasons. Of the remaining four, 3 got positive CBA’s and were 
accepted, one project was downsized. For many projects, the requirement of a standardised CBA led to a 
reformulation or postponement of the project. The reformulation is often a downsizing that permits the 
project to become economically efficient. We clearly cannot conclude from the Dutch experience that the 
obligation of undertaking a CBA following certain guidelines is a guarantee that an economically 
inefficient project is never accepted, but Annema et al. find a clear impact on public decision making. 
 
A second solution to restricting the common pool problem present in the federal funding of infrastructure 
would be to intervene only if a project has important spillovers. When there are no important benefit 
spillovers into other regions, it may be strictly preferable to leave the decision process at the member 
country level and not intervene in the funding of the investment. In addition, one could require private 
funding (without state guarantee) to finance a pre-specified minimum percentage of the project. The likely 
outcome would be that inefficient projects remain on paper, as private investors are generally very careful   20
at risking their own money. There are two drawbacks to this procedure. Firstly, efficient projects may be 
selected but may not be priced correctly, although public control is also no guarantee for instituting 
reasonable pricing tariffs but the incentives to do so are more likely to be present. Secondly, there may be 
socially efficient projects that will never be proposed by private operators because the benefits of the 
project cannot be sufficiently creamed by the operator, in which case there will be a mismatch between 
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